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Do  Borders  Matter? 
Soviet  Economic  Reform 
after  the  Coup 
MOST  ANALYSTS  were  surprised to  see  the  Soviet  empire collapsing 
under the weight of its own inefficiency.  As usual, this inefficiency was 
foreseen by the remarkable John Maynard Keynes,  who in 1934 wrote, 
I have not touched  on the real  strength  of Communism.  On the surface  Commu- 
nism  enormously  overestimates  the significance  of the economic  problem.  The 
economic  problem  is not too difficult  to solve. If you will leave that  to me, I will 
look after  it..  ..  Offered  to us as a means  of improving  the economic situation, 
[communism]  is an insult  to our intelligence.  But offered  as a means  of making 
the economic situation worse, that is its subtle, its almost irresistible, at- 
traction.  I 
There is little doubt that the irresistibly inefficient communist era is 
over, but the shape of the new regime is unclear. In this paper, we reflect 
on what difference a shift in power from the center to the republics will 
Our work on the Soviet transition  to the market  was sponsored  by the Economic 
Reform and Integration  Project of  the International  Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis in Laxenburg,  Austria. The views expressed here are solely those of the 
authors,  and  not those  of the institute.  Material  has  been  drawn  from  Peck  and  Richardson 
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make. In short, do borders-meaning the locus of political  authority  as 
well as geographical  size-matter  for economic growth  or for economic 
reform? 
The Economics of Borders 
Most economic analysis takes political structures  as given and asks 
about  the role of economic policies within  the given boundaries.  Virtu- 
ally all the proposals  on economic reform  in socialist economies exam- 
ine the appropriate  pace of privatization,  price liberalization,  and the 
opening  of the economy, but  none  asks about  the advantages  of different 
forms of political  devolution. Even our own reform  plan, prepared  for 
the Soviet Union  before  the August  coup, tiptoed  around  the redistribu- 
tion of political  power, as did most of the other plans, such as the  joint 
report  of the International  Monetary  Fund, World  Bank, Organization 
for Economic Cooperation  and Development, and European  Bank for 
Reconstruction  and  Development.2 
The Boundary Irrelevance Proposition 
According  to the neoclassical theory of political  boundaries,  the ex- 
act form  of the boundaries  between nations  is intrinsically  unimportant 
for long-run  economic performance.  The precise proposition  is that the 
average  income  in a region  is, to a first  approximation,  unaffected  by the 
placement  of boundary  lines in that region. From  an analytical  point of 
view, this proposition  rests on standard  neoclassical analysis and ap- 
plies strictly  to a nonmonetary  economy characterized  by perfect com- 
petition, private ownership  of all commodities, free trade, and no in- 
come redistribution  by the government.  In other  words, if we examine  a 
standard  general equilibrium  model with free trade, the outcome (in 
terms  of prices, incomes, and  outputs)  is independent  of whether  the dif- 
ferent commodities are identified as American, Soviet, Russian, or 
Kirgiz. 
We know of no test of the proposition  that  borders  are  irrelevant,  but 
a simple  one would  be to examine  the effect of national  size on per  capita 
2. See International  Monetary  Fund  and  others  (1990,  1991). William D. Nordhaus,  Merton J. Peck, and Thomas J. Richardson  323 
Figure 1.  Irrelevance of Borders: Country Size and 1987 Income 
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Source:  World Bank,  World Developnient  Report  1990; Central Intelligence  Agency,  World Factbook  1990; and 
adjustments by authors reflecting recent data in Akerlof and others  (1991) and Nordhaus  (1990). 
Output  and on economic  growth. Suppose  that national bounidaries are 
randomly drawn, or drawn relative  to some  characteristic  only partly 
economic,  such as the marriage patterns of the Hapsburgs. Further as- 
sume that the tendency of migration to equalize economic  performance 
is incomplete.  We could then examine the causal relationship between a 
nation's area and its economic performance. 
The two figures show the relationship between  country size and per 
capita gross national product in 1987 (figure 1) and between country size 
and the growth of per capita GNP from 1965 to 1987 (figure 2). The data 
set  we  use  contains  74 countries-all  the  countries  contained  in the 
World Bank's compilation of countries, augmented with data from East- 
ern European countries. The major omission in this data set is countries 
with a population of less than one million. 324  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
Figure  2. Irrelevance  of Borders:  Country  Size and Income  Growth 
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Source:  See  figure 1. 
a.  GNP growth is the annual growth of per capita GNP  between  1965 and 1987. 
The clear message  of both figures is that the breadth of boundaries 
has no clear association  either with recent growth rates or with longer- 
term growth as represented by the terminal level of per capita income. 
Formal cross-sectional  regression  analysis  of  the relation can be  ex- 
pressed, 
Y =  cl -0.049A,  RI  = 0.003; 
(0.107) 
g  =  C2 -0.083A,  R  2 =  0.006; 
(0. 129) 
where Y  is the log of per capita GNP in 1987 American dollars, A denotes 
the log of country area in thousands of square kilometers, g is the growth 
in per capita GNP from 1965 to 1987, and c, andC2  are constants.  There William  D. Nordhaus,  Merton  J. Peck, and Thomas  J. Richardson  325 
is clearly  more  to borders  than  the size of countries,  but  it is striking  how 
little relationship  there  is between size and  performance. 
In reality, economics is more  complicated  than the competitive,  free 
trade,  nonmonetary,  general  equilibrium  model suggests. Realistic  fea- 
tures-trade barriers,  fiscal  and  monetary  policies, and  government  reg- 
ulations-will  lend importance  to borders.  For example, trade  barriers 
are  a clear  exception  to the border-irrelevance  proposition,  for they act, 
in effect, as "negative  railroads"  by introducing  private  transportation 
costs among  nations. Government  stabilization  policies also violate the 
border-irrelevance  proposition  when there are strong nonlinearities  in 
the response  of the larger  aggregates  to differing  national  policies. In ad- 
dition, we know that there are economies of scale in a common cur- 
rency-a  feature  that many Western  Europeans  today believe to be an 
important  reason  for European  integration. 
The most important  economic  consequence  of boundaries,  however, 
lies in their  effect on government  monopolies  (where  monopoly  is used 
in the broad sense of monopoly on collective choices). It is often said 
that  within  the United  States  the states are  laboratories  for experiments. 
In the same vein, multiple  nation-states  allow  for constructive  competi- 
tion among  them  on alternative  ways of organizing  industry,  privatizing 
inefficient state enterprises, conducting monetary and fiscal policies, 
testing incomes policies, running  manpower  policies, along with many 
other  features  of a modern  welfare  state. 
Moving  outside  of economics  proper,  the border-irrelevance  proposi- 
tion also will be violated if people or nations begin to care about their 
borders  or about  the resources  on the other side of them. Almost every 
international  conflict has started  with a dispute over territory.  In this 
sense borders  are definitely  relevant, and, as the Kuwaitis and Iraqis 
most recently  learned,  such disputes  can bear  the seeds of economic  ca- 
tastrophe. Proliferation  of nations also allows proliferation  of armies 
and, perhaps  the most worrisome  side of the Soviet breakup,  potential 
proliferation  of nuclear  arsenals. 
The Breakup of the Austro-Hungarian  Empire 
In this century  many  empires  have fallen apart-the far-flung  British 
empire,  the only somewhat  smaller  French  one, the mini-empires  of the 
Netherlands,  Portugal,  and  Italy. Both Germany  and  Russia  have crum- 326  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
bled  or been dismembered  twice. It is the dissolution  of the Austro-Hun- 
garian  empire  in 1919,  however, that  provides  the closest parallel  to the 
likely events in the Soviet Union. Like the USSR, it was composed of 
diverse nationalities,  encompassing  present-day  Austria, Hungary,  the 
Czech and Slovak Federal  Republic, and parts of Poland, Yugoslavia, 
Romania,  Ukraine,  and  Italy. Also like the USSR, this empire  was a sin- 
gle economic unit  of adjacent  territories  with a single  currency.  Austria- 
Hungary  had a hub-and-spoke  transportation  system with Vienna and 
Budapest  serving  as hubs, as Moscow and St. Petersburg  do in the So- 
viet Union. The  breakup  itself  took only a few months,  following  the end 
of World  War  I, with a speed that may be comparable  to that of the So- 
viet Union. 
With nationalism  a strong force, independence  balkanized  the free 
trade  area  of the Austro-Hungarian  empire.  Tariffs,  exchange controls, 
and separate  currencies  were soon established,  with damaging  results: 
Austria  was left with sufficient  spinning  mills and finishing  works, but too few 
looms. At the same  time  Czechoslovakia,  where  the weaving  mills  were located, 
gave protection  to an infant  spinning  industry,  and so cut off the natural  outlet 
for Austrian  yarn.  Austria's  famous  tanneries  lost their  sources  of skins  and  tan- 
ning  materials;  her  Alpine  iron  works  their  coal-about  half  of the old coal fields 
having  gone to Czechoslovakia  and Poland. Czechoslovakia  contained  a high 
proportion  of the old Austrian  industries,  but not a population  large  enough  to 
absorb  their  products.  Hungary's  great  flour  mills  lost both  their  sources  of sup- 
ply and  the markets  for their  products.3 
Before the breakup,  the empire was doing well. Between 1870  and 
1913,  it boasted  an annual  growth  rate  of real  per capita  GNP lower  only 
than those of Germany, Sweden, and Denmark in Europe and well 
above those of the United Kingdom  and France.4  By contrast, during 
the interwar  period  an independent  Austria  languished;  its real GNP in 
1937  was 9 percent below its 1913  level. Hungary  and Czechoslovakia 
had annual  growth  rates of per capita  GNP between 1913  and 1937  that 
were two-thirds  that  of the empire.5  It is chilling  to note that  all  five  coun- 
tries associated  with remnants  of the Austro-Hungarian  empire  had ma- 
jor inflations.  The table shows the percent  increase  in prices in the post- 
World  War  I period:6 
3. Mitrany  (1936,  pp. 172-73). 
4. Good  (1984,  p. 238). 
5. The figures  were  calculated  from  data  in Mitchell  (1980,  pp. 819,  820, and  822). 
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Price 
Country  increase 
Austria  1,400,000 
Hungary  2,300,000 
Yugoslavia  990 
Romania  4,100 
Poland  250,000,000 
The problem was not the breakup of the empire per se but the dissolu- 
tion of the large free trade area and the loss of control over banking and 
fiscal institutions. Clearly, one can have a free trade area without an em- 
pire. That is perhaps what Keynes had in mind in 1919 when he proposed 
a free trade union for Europe so that 
some part  of the loss of organization  and  economic  efficiency  may  be retrieved, 
which must otherwise  result  from  the innumerable  new political  frontiers  now 
created  between greedy,  jealous, immature,  and economically  incomplete  na- 
tionalist  States. Economic  frontiers  were tolerable  so long as an immense  terri- 
tory  was included  in a few great  Empires;  but  they will not be tolerable  when  the 
Empires  of Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  Russia, and Turkey  have been parti- 
tioned  between  some twenty independent  authorities.7 
Reform Proposals before the Coup Attempt 
Along with a number of other economists, we three endeavored, 
starting  in December 1989,  to put together  a reform  proposal  for the So- 
viet Union.8  The unraveling  of its empire  after  the coup of August 1991 
means that economic reform  will now come primarily  from the repub- 
lics. This raises the question of how the shift from the union to the repub- 
lics changes our reform plan and other union-directed plans. As a pre- 
liminary to that inquiry, we restate the five major elements of the reform 
plan  we submitted  to the union  government. 
-Deregulate  prices. Firms  must be permitted  to set prices freely at 
profit-maximizing  levels. This will bring  goods out of the shadows  of the 
second economy and will mean goods are sold in the front of the store 
rather  than  illegally  out the back  door. Moreover,  price  deregulation  will 
eliminate the need for most enterprise subsidies, since firms will no 
7. Keynes  (1920,  p. 266). 
8. See Peck and  others  (1991).  The  group  was organized  by the International  Institute 
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longer be able to point to an irrational  price system as justification  for 
state  assistance.  This  will contribute  significantly  to eliminating  the state 
budget  deficit. Enterprise  subsidies  were estimated  at 132  billion  rubles 
in 1989, 13.5  percent  of gross domestic  product  and  about  one-and-one- 
half times the estimated  budget  deficit of 8.5 percent of GDP. It is this 
budget  deficit, financed  primarily  by money creation,  that has led to an 
uncontrolled  growth of the money supply. The resultant  "ruble  over- 
hang"-large cash and  bank  balances  in the hands  of households  and  en- 
terprises-has  frightened  Soviet reformers  away from price deregula- 
tion, since they see deregulation  as threatening  hyperinflation.  But an 
uncontrolled  growth  of money and prices is possible only with a large 
and  growing  budget  deficit, something  that  freeing  prices by eliminating 
the need for enterprise  subsidies  would make  less likely. 
-Corporatize  state enterprises. Although  privatization  is the ulti- 
mate goal, it is hard  to imagine  how the 46,000 large  and medium-sized 
Soviet state enterprises  could be sold off in a short period, though  the 
760,000  small-scale  shops, service firms,  and  the like lend themselves  to 
immediate  privatization.9  Even if the shares in the larger firms were 
given away to the entire  population  of a republic,  these enterprises  still 
will need to be managed  in the interim  by some organization.  We recom- 
mend "corporatization"-establishing republican Property Manage- 
ment  Agencies (PMAs)  that  would  act as majority  shareholders,  exercis- 
ing that control over managers necessary to maximize the long-run 
profits  of the firm.  Enterprises  would  be self-financing  and  managerially 
independent. PMAs could be established and the ownership of state 
assets transferred  to them very quickly, say in a month. They might 
function  in ways similar  to Western  mutual  funds. 
We think it important  to have independent  and self-financing  enter- 
prises in place to respond  to price deregulation.  Privatization,  even of 
the simplest  kind, is too slow to create such firms.  In the Czech and  Slo- 
vak Federal Republic, the coupon system of giving away shares to 
citizens involved an 18-month  preparation  time and encompassed  only 
1,500 firms. We stress, however, that privatization  should be the ulti- 
mate  goal and  that corporatization  is a first  step in that  process. 
-Stabilize  government  spending. Given the ruble  overhang  created 
by past increases in the money supply, a one-time  jump in prices upon 
9.  Transition  to the  Market  (1990,  p. 53). William  D. Nordhaus,  Merton  J. Peck, and Thomas  J. Richardson  329 
deregulation  is inevitable.  Yet, if the budget  deficit  is eliminated  or sub- 
stantially  reduced, this  jump will not necessarily  produce  a hyperinfla- 
tion. By eliminating  enterprise  subsidies, price deregulation  will facili- 
tate deficit stabilization,  though  there are other obvious candidates  for 
expenditure  cuts, such as military  expenditures.  A restrictive  monetary 
policy is also important  to establish  the credibility  of the ruble, thereby 
making  it convertible  both domestically  and  on international  foreign  ex- 
change markets.  And, with the exception of those unable to work, in- 
dexation  of wages, incomes, and  benefits  should  be avoided. 
-Moderate  the costs of unemployment. An effective reform plan will 
mean that many Soviet workers will lose their  jobs. The end of enter- 
prise subsidies will mean bankruptcy  for some firms, and the workers 
of these enterprises  will be forced  to find  other  employment.  A minimal 
unemployment  compensation  system is essential  to support  workers  un- 
til they relocate. 
-Open  the economy. Some have argued  that this measure  can wait 
for a later stage of the transition  period and that ruble  convertibility  is 
not essential  at the start  of the process. We disagree,  because  trade  liber- 
alization  and  price  deregulation  support  one another.  The existence of a 
large number  of monopolies  in the Soviet domestic market  means that 
foreign competition  will serve as the primary  brake  on price increases 
for many  goods. Further,  imports  of relatively  high quality  should  pro- 
vide a work incentive  for domestic workers, since rubles, albeit  a lot of 
them, could purchase  these goods. 
These measures  all support  one another.  They  form  a consistent  plan, 
requiring  the simultaneous  adoption  of all five. If taken  up singly  or over 
time, they will suffer  the fate of the halfway  reform  measures  of the past 
six years. Adopted quickly as an integrated  plan, they give the best 
chance  to stem  the current  economic  decline  and  provide  a basis  for eco- 
nomic  growth  in the future. 
These, then, were our  proposals  to a union  government  in 1990.  Since 
then some significant  changes have occurred.  An unemployment  com- 
pensation  system has been established.  Prices have been increased  sig- 
nificantly  by administrative  action  in April  1991,  and  40 percent  of goods 
were freed of central  controls. But existing price controls continue to 
preclude  a market  system. The deficit  has worsened to an estimated  20 
percent of GDP and is financed by printing  rubles. Viktor Gerash- 
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bachev that the "Soviet Union is standing  on the brink  of financial  col- 
lapse."'0  Enterprises  have become partially  managerially  independent 
by ignoring  governmental  directives but still lack the control an owner 
would  exert and  continue  to collect state subsidies. 
Economic Reform with Fuzzy Borders 
The above plan, devised between December 1989 and November 
1990,  largely  sidestepped  the thorny  issues of political  structure.  Today, 
economic reformers  must consider  the issues of political  and economic 
federalism.  The question  we consider in this section is how our earlier 
reform  plan  applies  to the new situation  with  its different  agglomerations 
or fragments  of Soviet republics. Do borders matter for reform pro- 
posals? 
Reform in a Fragmented  Union 
Whether  economic reform  is carried  out by the union  or by the vari- 
ous republics,  it must include  price deregulation.  With  the exception of 
natural  monopolies, continued price regulation  is simply inconsistent 
with enhanced  economic  efficiency,  at any level of economic  or political 
sovereignty. Indeed, price deregulation  becomes even more necessary 
at the level of an individual  republic  if it is carried  out in adjacent  repub- 
lics. Moreover,  the case for transitional  price controls, designed  to pro- 
tect domestic consumers and producers  from a one-time shock upon 
price  deregulation,  is even weaker  at the republican  level, for these units 
are less likely to have the full range  of supply  possibilities available  at 
the union level. For instance, holding  the price of oil below its equilib- 
rium  level will not help a non-oil-producing  republic  like Armenia,  since 
the Russian  oil can be sold elsewhere at a higher  price. 
Property  rights  must be assigned at an early stage of the reform, at 
either  the central  or the republican  level. Indeed,  the collapse  of the cen- 
ter  may simplify  reform  measures  by removing  the union  as an important 
claimant  on the title to state enterprises.  Nevertheless, it makes sense 
for a republic  as well as for the union  to corporatize  state assets, remov- 
10. Frances  X. Clines, "A Bleak Economy Dims Soviet Hopes for a Free Market," 
New York  Times,  September  9, 1991,  p. A1. William D. Nordhaus,  Merton J. Peck, and Thomas J. Richardson  331 
ing them  from  direct  subordination  to branch  ministries  at the union  and 
republican  levels. Privatization-which entails sorting  out the claims  of 
the workers, the management,  local governments,  the republican  gov- 
ernment,  the union government,  and perhaps  even those whose prop- 
erty was expropriated  decades ago-will  be time consuming  and diffi- 
cult. Corporatizing  state firms, however, will clarify the managerial 
hierarchy  at any level ofjurisdiction. 
No effective economic  reform  is possible unless fiscal  discipline  is re- 
stored  at all levels of government.  As long as there  is a single  Soviet cen- 
tral bank and a common currency, investors will be reluctant  to hold 
either  republican  or union  debt, and  the power to enforce this hard  gov- 
ernmental  budget  constraint  will rest entirely  with Gosbank.  The Yugo- 
slavian crisis foreshadows  the consequences of multiple  central  banks 
with  a single  currency.  If there  are  independent  republican  central  banks 
and  republican  currencies,  each republic  will need to avoid a deficit  and 
an escalating  money supply. Otherwise  they will have the inflation  and 
deteriorating  exchange  rate  that  the union  has experienced. 
It seems likely that the different  resource  bases of the union, repub- 
lics, autonomous  republics,  and  even oblasts  will  produce  economic  and 
political dislocations  in the transition  to a more decentralized  political 
regime. The Russian republic  has a great wealth of natural  resources, 
including  oil and  natural  gas, whereas  some of the smaller  central  Asian 
republics have very little. The latter will thus have more limited tax 
bases and  will  be less able  to protect  their  populations  against  the vicissi- 
tudes of the transition  period.  This consequence  of the collapse  may not 
seem fair  to the poorer  regions,  but it does not change  the basic fact that 
governmental  budget  deficits  create  inflation  and  not goods. 
Finally, when compared  with the former Soviet Union, the smaller 
republics have even more reason to be open to the world economy. 
Many  products  they previously  acquired  within  the union will now be- 
come imports,  making  tariffs  on them costly in the short run. The mo- 
nopoly problems  they face will be even more severe, making  foreign 
competition  especially  useful  in holding  down  domestic  prices. The  Rus- 
sian  republic,  by contrast,  may have market  power in several  commodi- 
ties, particularly  in natural  resources. Russia  might  be tempted  to exer- 
cise  its  market power through import or export tariffs or quotas, 
although  on the whole this seems unwise given the need to align  prices 
with realistic social costs. 332  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1991 
In broad  brush, then, the logic of economic reform  holds at various 
levels of government.  That  should  not be too surprising,  though,  for the 
standard  prescriptions  for ailing economies differ little between large 
and small  countries. 
The Monopoly Problem 
The next major  concern  we consider  is that  the industrial  structure  of 
the Soviet economy is extraordinarily  centralized.  Soviet planners  have 
treated  the union  as one economic unit and  have made  their  investment 
decisions on that basis for decades. The result  is a geographically  inter- 
twined economy with substantial  interrepublican  trade. Table 1 shows 
the ratio of interrepublican  exports to the net material  product of the 
republics.  All are  dependent  on other  republics  for their  export  markets, 
and  the corresponding  imports  provide  them  with intermediate  and  final 
goods. The Russian republic  is the least dependent  on the others, re- 
flecting  its large  population  and  geographical  diversity. Surprisingly,  al- 
though  the degree of external  openness of the Soviet Union is low, the 
internal  interdependence  of the republics  is relatively  high and reflects 
more than geographical  propinquity.  Interrepublican  trade  was 21 per- 
cent of Soviet GDP in 1988,  whereas  European  Community  trade, both 
among members and the rest of the world, was about 14 percent of 
GDP.II 
Table 1 also shows the balance  of trade  among  the republics.  At do- 
mestic prices, trade is in rough balance for each of the republics. But 
the picture  changes radically  if the trade  balances are restated  in world 
prices: the Russian republic  has a substantial  positive balance;  all but 
one of the remaining  fourteen republics have a deficit. This dramatic 
change  reflects  a domestic  price  of oil that  is only a fraction  of the world 
price12 and the position of Russia as the world's largest oil producer, 
with more  than  90 percent  of Soviet oil production.  13 
Borders  definitely  matter  when it comes to republics  collecting  royal- 
ties on natural  resources. Although  oil is the product  that  is most under- 
priced and in which Russia is most dominant,  the republic  does well in 
11. IMF  and  others  (1991,  vol. 1, pp. 193-94). 
12. As of late August,  gasoline  in St. Petersburg  was selling  at 0.4 ruble  a liter, equal 
to $0.045  a gallon  at the tourist  exchange  rate. 
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Table 1. Interrepublican  Trade  in the Soviet  Union, 1987-88 
Trade  balance, 1987 
Exports,  1988  (billions  of rubles) 
(percent  of  Valued  at  Valued  at 
net material  domestic  world 
product)  prices  prices 
USSR  29.3  ...  ... 
RSFSR  18.0  3.6  28.5 
Ukraine  39.1  1.6  -3.9 
Belorussia  69.6  3.1  -2.2 
Estonia  66.5  -0.2  -  1.1 
Latvia  64.1  -0.3  -  1.4 
Lithuania  60.9  -0.4  -3.3 
Moldova  62.1  0.6  -1.5 
Georgia  53.7  0.6  -1.5 
Armenia  63.7  0.6  -0.3 
Azerbaijan  58.7  2.0  0.2 
Kazakhstan  30.9  -5.4  -6.6 
Turkmenistan  50.7  -0.3  ... 
Uzbekistan  43.2  - 3.9  -4.5 
Tadzhikistan  41.8  -  1.1  -  1.4 
Kirgizia  50.2  -0.5  -1.0 
Source: International  Monetary  Fund  and others  (1991,  vol. 1, pp. 225, 227). 
other key resources, with 77 percent  of the Soviet Union's natural  gas, 
55 percent  of the coal, and  44 percent  of the iron  ore.  14 
The infrastructure  of the Soviet Union is also designed  for an inter- 
dependent  economy. Railroads  and  airlines  follow a hub-and-spoke  pat- 
tern  around  Moscow and  St. Petersburg.  Telecommunications  is the ex- 
treme  example  of centralization  and interdependence:  the international 
telephone  transit  center  in Moscow, with  a capacity  of 800  outgoing  calls 
at any one time, handles  all the international  calls of the present  union.  15 
Many Soviet institutions,  from the university  system to science estab- 
lishments,  have been organized  primarily  on an all-union  basis. 
Soviet central  planners  consciously developed a monopolistic  econ- 
omy. This reflected  both their  view that  competition  was wasteful  and  a 
naive belief in the existence of economies of scale matched  only by col- 
lege freshmen  and Lenin, who saw socialism  as one giant  factory. The 
14. IMF  and  others  (1991,  vol. 1, pp. 212-13). 
15. IMF and others  (1991,  vol. 3, p. 128).  For reference,  Yale University  can handle 
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Table  2. Business  Concentration,  Soviet  Union  and the United  States 
Percent 
Soviet product  groups:  U.S. industries: 
share of single  share offour 
largest producer,  largest  producers, 
Market  share  1988  1982 
0-50  39.2  72.6 
50-75  24.1  21.3 
75-100  36.6  6.1 
Sources: Peck and Richardson  (1991, p. 65). The table shows the percentage  of product  groups  and four-digit 
industries  according  to the shares  of total  output  counted  by the single  largest  and  four  largest  producers,  respectively. 
The Soviet column  does not add to 100  because  of rounding  error. 
result has been to make the Soviet economy the most concentrated  of 
any large economy. Table 2 compares enterprise  concentration  in the 
Soviet Union to that  in the United States. The difference  is dramatic.  In 
more than one-third  of product  groups, a single Soviet enterprise  ac- 
counts for between 75 and 100 percent of total output; in only one- 
sixteenth of American  four-digit  industries  do the top  four companies 
account  for a comparable  percentage. 
Such is the legacy the central  planners  have left for economic  reform. 
The question here is, does the monopoly problem  change if the union 
becomes  fifteen republics? It  may make little  difference initially 
whether  or not the republics  are a free trade  region  among  themselves. 
Consider the case of filter cigarettes, produced for all of the Soviet 
Union by a single  enterprise  in Armenia.  With  free trade,  that  enterprise 
can still extract monopoly  profits  from smokers throughout  the Soviet 
Union. If the other  republics  impose  tariffs  on filter  cigarettes,  they may 
be able to capture some portion of the monopoly profits that would 
otherwise flow to the Armenian  enterprise, but at the cost of raising 
prices to consumers. 
The primary  solution to the monopoly problem  lies in the classical 
process by which monopoly  profits  in the long run  attract  competitors. 
It is at this point that the question  of whether  the present Soviet Union 
is a free trade  area  or not becomes crucial.  Would  a new Moldovan  pro- 
ducer  of filter  cigarettes  have a unionwide  market  of 288 million  people 
orjust the 4 million  people  in Moldova?  Obviously  a larger  market  would 
make  entry  more  profitable.  Of course, a new entrant  might  still be able 
to sell cigarettes unionwide despite tariff barriers,  but these barriers 
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One can expect competition  from  outside the Soviet Union to check 
the present monopolies, but firms  located within the union boundaries 
are  a more  effective source  of competition  because they will have lower 
transportation  costs and cultural  barriers.  This is so particularly  if the 
union remains a free trade area. We conclude with the fundamental 
proposition  that breaking  up the present continental market  through 
trade  barriers  will make monopoly  not  just a transitional  problem  but a 
persistent  one. 
Borders  matter  because monopoly  matters.  One-third  of the immedi- 
ate gain estimated  by the EEC's Commission  for Europe 1992  (1.6 per- 
cent of GDP)  comes from  competition  effects on x-inefficiency,  and  the 
commission  sees further  long-term  gains  from  the increased  innovation 
that greater  competition  can promote.  16 The cost of monopoly  must be 
many  times that  for the Soviet Union, given its very high  level of enter- 
prise concentration.  In addition,  monopoly shows up more in the poor 
product quality and the low level of innovation  of Soviet enterprises 
than  in their  current  production  costs. 
If the republics  band  together  as a free trade  area, the breakup  of the 
union  would not worsen the monopoly  problem,  though  there is one ca- 
veat. One of the pre-coup  reform  plans, the Shatalin  Plan, proposed  an 
aggressive  antitrust  policy that now is likely to be implemented  by the 
republics.  The record  in Europe, however, is that anticompetitive  poli- 
cies for export  industries  tend to be sanctioned  on the logic that  the ex- 
ploitation of consumers abroad serves the national interest whereas 
milking  domestic  consumers  (and  voters)  does not. Similarly,  the Webb- 
Pomerene  Act sanctions the formation  of export cartels by U.S. firms 
that  would  be illegal  domestically. 
Republican  antitrust  policy, then, may be less vigorous  than  a union 
policy, particularly  in the smaller  republics.  There is considerable  con- 
troversy  in academic  circles as to how much  of a difference  antitrust  pol- 
icy can make  to economic  performance,  but  these debates  are  in the con- 
text of an established  market  economy. It seems likely antitrust  policy 
will be more significant  in an economy in which government  policy has 
promoted  monopoly  for decades. 
Antitrust  policy provides one example of how borders may shape 
public  policy. Larger  governmental  units  may  have less of a tendency  to 
16. Peck (1989,  p. 279). 336  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
devise policies that  help producers  at the expense of consumers,  simply 
because less of their  production  is exported. This may explain  why the 
central  authorities  in the European  Community  are increasingly  active 
in promulgating  competition  policy, developing  product  standards,  and 
limiting  the use of subsidies  and tax concessions, often in opposition  to 
national  governments.  Conversely, in the United States, states and lo- 
calities are devoting increased levels of business subsidies and tax 
abatements  to attracting  firms. 
Marketization  through Decentralization 
In considering  the role of political  structures,  we must also consider 
the role of political  competition  and emulation  among  different  political 
jurisdictions. In the Soviet context, the possibility of devolution of 
power  from  the center  to the republics  was a central  part  of the Shatalin, 
or 500-Day,  Plan.  17 Ironically,  the Shatalin  Plan  foreshadowed  a redistri- 
bution of power from the union to the republics  that closely resembles 
the actual  redistribution  that  appears  to be taking  place in the post-coup 
shakedown.  It seems likely to us, particularly  given the prominence  of 
economic reformer  Grigory  Yavlinsky in the current  union and in the 
Russian councils, that the 500-Day Plan will serve as a blueprint  for 
reform.  18 
In analyzing  the plan, most observers  have held that  the primary  pur- 
pose was simply  to transfer  power and  resources  from  the center  to the 
republics.  We wondered  whether  there was perhaps  a more subtle  pur- 
pose as well. In transferring  power away from the central authorities, 
with their monopoly  over pricing,  allocation,  and other economic deci- 
sions, it seems likely that the forces of competition  would be strength- 
ened. The reason behind  this is a factor we call marketization  through 
political decentralization. 
Marketization  through  political  decentralization  means  the tendency 
of governments  to change  arrangements  by which outsiders  can realize 
arbitrage  profits  from subsidies or other government  programs.  In the 
traditional  Soviet-type  system, there  were heavy subsidies  on foodstuffs 
17.  Transition to the Market (1990). 
18. A preliminary  version of the reform  plan proposed  by Yavlinsky  and others ap- 
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and energy. As long as the borders were closed and trade carefully 
controlled, the possibilities for arbitrage  were limited. When borders 
opened  up and  the empire  collapsed,  the old system of subsidies  on trad- 
able  goods was no longer  viable. For example,  after  the departure  of the 
Eastern  European  countries  from the Stalinist  system, the pressure  to 
raise the prices on tradables  was irresistible.  Czech bread  prices were 
raised  to keep middlemen  from  buying  bread  in Prague  to sell in Vienna. 
We expect that  the same forces will begin  to operate  once the repub- 
lics become autonomous  economic entities, even before their econo- 
mies are completely  privatized  or prices deregulated.  As republics  be- 
come free to make  their  own decisions, they will be unwilling  to provide 
tradable  goods at a great  discount  to other republics  when they can sell 
them for enormously  scarce hard currencies  on the world market.  As 
one republic  begins  to revalue  goods and  try to sell at world  prices, oth- 
ers will follow suit either out of pure economic interest or out of spite 
and revenge. This process will work more smoothly for standardized 
commodities  (like oil) and will be accelerated  to the extent that  there is 
a functioning  currency  and  external  borders  open to international  trade. 
We aver that the hypothesis of marketization  through  decentraliza- 
tion is largely  a theoretical  possibility, and  we have no evidence that  the 
authors  of the 500-Day  Plan actually  had this in mind  when they wrote 
their  blueprint.  Nevertheless, we can point to two pieces of recent evi- 
dence to suggest that it may be an important  factor in speeding  market 
forces. The first  is the reaction  of countries  to the breakup  of the Soviet 
empire in 1989-90. Shortly after the Eastern European countries re- 
gained their autonomy, they announced  they would only accept hard 
currency  for part  of their  exports; in response, the Soviet Union raised 
oil prices  to Eastern  European  countries.  A second example  came in the 
tussle about  grain  and meat  prices in 1990.  Following  the Ryzhkov  gov- 
ernment's  announcement  in May 1990  that increased  agricultural  pro- 
curement  prices would take effect in January  1991, farmers  began to 
withhold  deliveries  to the state in anticipation  of the higher  prices. Boris 
Yeltsin, who in mid-summer  of 1990  became  the president  of the Russian 
parliament,  announced  in September  1990  that  the Russian  government 
would begin paying the higher  prices immediately.  This led to the de- 
sired deliveries by Russian farmers  as well as by Ukrainian  farmers. 
Ukrainian officials, unhappy that Russian stores were filling with 
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Russian government  is then said to have banned the export of oil to 
Ukraine.  At that  point, the potential  trade  war  forced the union  govern- 
ment  to introduce  the new agricultural  procurement  prices for the entire 
nation  ahead  of schedule  on October  1, 1990.19 
Even without the disintegration  of central economic authority,  the 
Soviet Union faces mounting  macroeconomic  problems: the govern- 
ment  budget  deficit  is unsustainably  large,  incomes  are  rising  much  more 
rapidly  than  output,  there is open inflation  estimated  to exceed 100  per- 
cent in 1991,  repressed  inflation  continues, and  there is a flight  from  the 
ruble. If the projections  of the decline in output  are realized,  the Soviet 
Union is heading  into the equivalent  of the Great  Depression. 
Although  the breakup  of empire  may, as we just argued,  be a healthy 
spur to the transition  to the market, the macroeconomic  path seems 
more  perilous,  particularly  with  respect  to monetary  management.  Until 
recently, Soviet consumers  had  a strong  faith  in the stability  of the ruble. 
With the recent inflation,  the proliferation  of local coupons and quasi- 
currency  schemes, such as that in Ukraine, and the penetration  of for- 
eign currency,20  the quality of the ruble as the standard  of value is 
quickly  eroding. 
The monetary  prospects are somewhat different  for the central re- 
publics  than  for the peripheral  ones. There  will probably  be a large  ruble 
zone that will encompass  Russia  and, perhaps,  Belorussia  and Kazakh- 
stan-call  this the "central  zone." If only these three republics  join the 
common currency  zone, this will account for 61 percent of the USSR 
population  and 70 percent of national  output.21 If Ukraine  joins, these 
figures  will be 79 percent  and 86 percent, respectively. 
For the central  zone, the monetary  prescriptions  are basically  ortho- 
dox. Because the government  has virtually  no nonmonetary  liabilities  to 
the private  sector, monetary  control  requires  reducing  the budget  deficit 
19. Bill Keller, "Malevolent  Boomerang  Rules Soviet Economy,"  New York  Times, 
October  22, 1990,  p. A8; Aslund  (1991,  p. 38);  Aven (1991,  p. 203). 
20. According  to Soviet experts  reporting  in mid-1990,  there  was relatively  little  "dol- 
larization"  or use of hard  currencies  as either  assets or means  of transaction.  We received 
unofficial  estimates  from  banking  experts  of the dollar  balances  of the Soviet population 
being  around  $0.4 billion.  Estimates  in the Shatalin  Plan  indicated  that $2 billion  in hard 
currency  was in circulation,  which  at the highly  undervalued  tourist  exchange  rate  of 32 
rubles to the dollar would be about two-thirds  of M2. At a more realistic  purchasing- 
power-parity  exchange  rate  of 3 rubles  to the dollar,  the value  of foreign  currencies  would 
appear  to be modest. 
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substantially.  This is no easy task given the massive  government  budget 
imbalance  in the Soviet Union today-the  cash deficit  is somewhere  be- 
tween 10  and  20 percent  of GNP. Democracies  without  a strong  and  uni- 
fied government  are also not known for their iron budget  discipline. In 
addition,  because of the likelihood  of substantial  price increases when 
prices are  liberalized,  the government  must  be wary  of the Tanzi  effect, 
which occurs if the real value of taxes falls more sharply  than the real 
value of spending  when prices rise. Virtually  all Western  and Eastern 
reform  plans  recognize  the need for budget  discipline  if monetary  stabil- 
ity is to be achieved. 
The more difficult  decisions pertain  to the "independent"  republics: 
should  they print  their  own currency  rather  than  cast their  lot with what 
they see as the worthless  (and,  not to be ignored,  largely  Russian)  ruble? 
Although  adopting  one's own national  currency  is no less seductive  than 
having a national  airline, it is a perilous course. These countries  have 
no foreign  exchange,22  and they are likely to inherit  substantial  foreign 
indebtedness.  It is instructive  to note that  many  of the hyperinflations  of 
this century  have taken  place in the remnants  of decaying  or dismantled 
empires.  If the republics  choose to issue their  own currencies,  they must 
establish  the necessary  confidence  to attain  monetary  stability.  Without 
balanced  budgets  or substantial  hard  currency  reserves, it is hard  to see 
how the new republics  can establish confidence in new crowns (Esto- 
nia), lats' (Latvia),  and  hryvnas  (Ukraine). 
A worrisome  feature  of the disintegrating  empire  is the need to coor- 
dinate  the replacement  of the "imperial  ruble"  with a new set of curren- 
cies. It seems likely that at least four new countries (the Baltics and 
Ukraine)  and currencies  will emerge  quickly.  These countries  will need 
to fashion  a monetary  reform  to replace  the ruble  holdings  and  financial 
assets and  liabilities  of their  citizens and  firms.  If the monetary  reforms 
are  not coordinated,  the potential  for speculation  is substantial  as people 
send their rubles to the republics  that appear  to offer the best conver- 
sion. Republics  that  have retired  their  citizens' rubles  will be tempted  to 
spend the rubles  in the shrinking  ruble  zone, increasing  the ruble  over- 
hang.  The temptation  to erect border  controls  will increase  when  repub- 
lic A tries  to spend  its retired  rubles  to buy vodka  in the stores  of republic 
B before  B's currency  reform.  The last republic  to reform  will  be holding 
22. According  to press reports,  the Lithuanian  government  has enough  foreign  ex- 
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the bag of worthless  rubles.  This sure  recipe  for hyperinflation  seems to 
have occurred  to Yeltsin, who on October 15, 1991,  called for the cre- 
ation  of a new, blue, white, and  Russian  red ruble.23 
The nightmare  of a hyperinflation  produced  by uncoordinated  mone- 
tary  reforms  suggests  that  reform  of the currencies,  coordinated  among 
the republics,  should  be at the top of the economic agenda. 
Conclusion 
Do borders  matter?  Of course they do. While the logic of economic 
reform is relatively robust to whether reforms are carried  out by the 
union  or the republics,  political  structures  do matter  for some aspects of 
governance. Economic activity is among the first casualties in inter- 
ethnic or interrepublican  strife, as the recent events in Yugoslavia so 
starkly demonstrate. With approximately  a hundred  nationalities  di- 
vided into fifteen  union republics,  twenty autonomous  republics,  eight 
autonomous  oblasts, and  ten autonomous  okrugs,  the Soviet Union has 
an awesome potential  for strife  and  violence. 
The major  way that political  structures  are likely to affect economic 
performance  is when they produce  trade  barriers,  investor  hesitancy  in 
the face of uncertainty,  and changes in laws and regulations  as regimes 
change. But the intrinsic  importance  of borders  is often overestimated. 
One is tempted  to tell republican  and  union  leaders  that  it does not much 
matter  how governance structures  are established as long as they are 
done so with determination.  The lesson was well stated by Keynes in 
The Economic  Consequences  of the Peace: 
In a regime  of Free  Trade  and  free economic  intercourse  it would  be of little  con- 
sequence that iron lay on one side of a political  frontier,  and labor, coal, and 
blast furnaces  on the other. But as it is, men have devised ways to impoverish 
themselves  and  one another;  and  prefer  collective animosities  to individual  hap- 
piness.24 
23.  Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Daily Report on the Soviet Union, No.  193, Oc- 
tober 16, 1991. 
24.  Keynes  (1920, p. 99). 